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ABSTRACT 
Climate change leads to more frequent and more intense droughts in Somalia. In a global context, weather 
shocks have been found to perpetuate poverty and fuel civil conflict. By relating regional and temporal 
variations in violent conflict outbreaks with drought incidence and severity, we show that this causality is 
valid also for Somalia at the local level. We find that livestock price shocks drive drought-induced 
conflicts through reducing the opportunity costs of conflict participation. Our estimation results indicate 
that a temperature rise of around 3.2 degrees Celsius—corresponding to the median Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change scenario for eastern Africa by the end of the century—would lower cattle prices 
by about 4 percent and, in turn, increase the incidence of violent conflict by about 58 percent. Hence 
climate change will further aggravate Somalia’s security challenges and calls for decisive action to 
strengthen both drought and conflict resilience, especially in pastoralist and agropastoralist livelihoods. 
Keywords:  drought, conflict, civil war, livestock, prices, Somalia, Horn of Africa 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Extreme weather events have become more frequent and more intense since the middle of the 20th 
century worldwide and are likely to become even more pronounced throughout the 21st century due to 
climate change (IPCC 2012). Particularly, the number and length of warm weather spells and heat waves 
have increased globally. Strong evidence exists that such extreme temperature events will further augment 
at the global scale as well as in the Horn of Africa, giving rise to more and more severe droughts. After 
consecutive years of irregular or failing seasonal rainfall, in 2011 Somalia experienced the most 
destructive drought in the last 50 years (Maxwell and Fitzpatrick 2012). The resulting famine has pushed 
the number of Somalis in need of emergency assistance to about four million, with more than half a 
million at imminent risk of starvation in early 2012 (FSNAU and FEWSNET 2011). Although the 2011 
drought was largely a result of the prevailing climatic phenomenon La Niña (leading to poor rainfall in 
the Horn of Africa), extreme temperatures and rainfall failures have become more common in recent 
years. At the same time, Somalia has been rattled by civil war, ongoing since 1991, and violent disputes 
have become more frequent recently, especially since 2002. The coexisting trends raise the fundamental 
question about a potential relationship between the occurrence of drought and the risk of civil conflict. 
Historical data point to a strong relationship between warming and civil war on the African 
continent, with warmer years leading to increased likelihood of conflict. Burke et al. (2009) estimate that 
a rise in temperature of 1 degree Celsius increases the incidence of internal armed conflict in African 
countries south of the Sahara (SSA) by 4.5 percent in the same year and 0.9 percent in the next year. 
Combining these estimates with climate model projections of future temperature trends suggests a 54 
percent increase in armed conflict incidence by 2030 (Burke et al. 2009). Hsiang, Meng, and Cane (2011) 
found that the probability of conflict outbreaks arising throughout the tropics doubles during El Niño 
years (leading to warmer and dryer weather in the continental tropics) relative to La Niña years. The 
authors estimate that El Niño–Southern Oscillation may have contributed globally to 21 percent of all 
civil conflicts since 1950. O’Loughlin et al. (2012) show that abnormally high temperatures and low 
rainfall increased the risk of violent conflict in East Africa (covering Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda) over the past two decades. Also, based on data from 
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, Raleigh and Kniveton (2012) found that the frequency of conflict events in 
East Africa increases in periods of extreme climate variation, with higher rates of rebel conflict exhibiting 
during anomalously dry conditions. Although these studies show that the stability of African societies 
relates strongly to the global climate (Hsiang, Meng, and Cane 2011) and emphasize the urgent need for 
reforming government (and development partner) policies to deal with rising temperatures (Burke et al. 
2009), they reveal little about the channels and causal mechanisms through which climate extremes affect 
people’s motivation to engage in civil conflict. Yet understanding the channels of transmission and the 
factors driving conflict is critical to the search for both effective climate change mitigation and conflict 
prevention strategies (Schreffan et al. 2012). 
Following the seminal work by Collier and his coauthors on the causes of civil war (Collier and 
Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Collier and Sambanis 2002), economic behavior has been frequently used to explain 
people’s incentives to participate in conflict. Probably the most robust finding throughout the conflict 
literature is that slow economic growth and low per capita income contribute to civil conflict (Blattman 
and Miguel 2010). Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) found that economic opportunities, such as expected 
income from being a fighter relative to ordinary labor market rates, motivate people to participate in 
violent conflict rather than political and social grievances such as repression against particular social 
groups and societal inequality. Findings on the roles of ethnic or religious fractionalization (Easterly and 
Levine 1997; Fearon and Laitin 2003), natural resources dependency (Humphreys 2005; Brunnschweiler 
and Bulte 2009), and degree of democracy (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Hegre et al. 2001) as drivers or 
preventers of civil conflict are quite inconsistent. 
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Introduced by Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004), the model explaining conflict participation as an 
outcome of changes in opportunity costs has been used and advanced to link the occurrence of conflict 
events to extreme weather conditions, assuming causal relationship between weather shocks and adverse 
economic conditions (Kurukalasuriya et al. 2006; Schlenker and Lobell 2010; Dell, Jones, and Olken 
2012). Methodologically, this approach offers an appealing solution to address the endogeneity of 
economic variables to conflict in econometric estimations. Using rainfall variation as an instrument for 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth to minimize endogeneity biases and omitted variable problems, 
Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) estimate that a negative growth shock of five percentage points 
increases the likelihood of conflict in SSA by one-half in the following year.1 Likewise Brückner (2010) 
uses rainfall-based variables as instruments in his estimation of the global conflict effects of population 
growth and GDP growth. In this paper, we adopt the basic estimation framework as proposed by Miguel, 
Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) but modify it to focus our analysis rather on the effects of droughts on 
civil conflicts at the local level and livestock prices as channels of transmission. 
We hypothesize that droughts fuel civil war in Somalia through lowering the opportunity costs of 
conflict participation. Given that the livestock sector is the mainstay of the country’s economy, we further 
hypothesize that drought increases the risk of conflict through livestock price downturns that entail 
substantial income losses. The objective of our paper is to test these hypotheses, econometrically estimate 
the impact of drought and associated livestock price shocks on the likelihood of conflict outbreaks, and 
derive policy-relevant conclusions from the estimation results. 
Our paper makes several important contributions to the literature. It contributes to the 
microeconomic strand of the empirical literature that has been dominated by cross-country studies (for 
example, Blattman and Miguel 2010). The cross-country nature of previous studies, however, leaves 
regional (subnational) heterogeneity unobserved and thus limits the ability to derive context-specific 
recommendations for effective strategies and national policies of conflict prevention. In contrast, our 
analysis explores the heterogeneity at the administrative region level. While other studies on Somalia 
have dealt mainly with the economic and social consequences of the collapse of the central state in 1991 
(for example, Little 2003; Mubarak 1997; Powell, Ford, and Nowrasteh 2008) or piracy in recent years 
(for example, Shortland 2011; Besley, Fetzer, and Mueller 2012), we provide evidence on people’s 
incentives to participate in civil conflict. By looking at livestock price shocks, we shed light on the role of 
local market pricing in changing the incentives for conflict participation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides contextual information on the 
links between drought, livestock prices, and conflict in Somalia and thus establishes the rationale 
underlying our empirical analysis. Section 3 explains our identification strategy and estimation 
framework applied to test our hypotheses. It also provides information on the underlying data and the 
constructed indicators used in the empirical model. Section 4 presents the estimation results of our 
preferred model specification, and Section 5 discusses the results of our robustness checks and validity of 
identifying assumptions. Section 6 concludes with policy implications. 
                                                     
1 The robustness of Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti’s (2004) estimation results have been subject to an intense debate 
between Ciccone (2011) and Miguel and Satyanath (2011). For similar reasons Buhaug (2010) questions Burke et al.’s (2009) 
estimation results. Although reviewing the arguments related to these cross-country studies is beyond the scope of this paper, the 
debate has motivated our sensitivity analysis presented in Section 5. Klomp and Bulte (2012) provide a comprehensive review of 
the debate. 
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2.  STUDY CONTEXT AND THE CONFLICT–DROUGHT NEXUS 
Since the collapse of the national government and the outbreak of civil war in 1991, Somalia has had no 
central government control over the entire territory. The country has been divided into at least three 
(semi)autonomous territories on a de facto basis, namely, Somaliland in the northwest, Puntland in the 
northeast, and the remainder of Somalia in the central and southern part with its capital, Mogadishu. 
While violent conflicts have occurred all over the country, most of them have taken place in the central-
southern regions of the country, where the Islamist Al-Shabab militia has been most active.2 
Despite the absence of effective national governance since 1991, Somalia has maintained a 
functioning informal economy dominated by livestock rearing and exports, remittances inflows and 
money transfers, and telecommunications (Powell, Ford, and Nowrasteh 2008; World Factbook 2011). 
Traditionally the livestock sector has been central to the economic and cultural life of Somalis. The 
livestock sector contributes to approximately 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and accounts 
for almost 90 percent of total agricultural GDP and more than half of all exports earnings (Knips 2004; 
World Factbook 2011). It provides food and income to more than 60 percent of the total population 
(FSNAU and FEWSNET 2011). Given that about two-thirds of the population reside in rural areas 
(World Bank and UNDP 2003), pastoralism (nomadism) or semipastoralism is the source of livelihood 
for most rural Somalis, while a significant number of urban dwellers are also engaged in livestock-related 
activities including livestock trading and processing of livestock products. Purely pastoralist livelihoods 
are prevailing in northern and central Somalia, and agropastoral livelihoods are predominant in the 
southern part and some pockets in the northwestern and central parts (FSNAU 2011a). Countrywide goat 
and sheep herds are most common, while cattle herds are more numerous in the southern regions than in 
the northern regions. Somalia is highly vulnerable to weather shocks—especially droughts (but also 
floods)—because of its geographic location and fragile environments (FSNAU 2011a), so the occurrence 
of drought in Somalia is not unusual but is rather a recurring feature of the country’s climate. 
Nonetheless, prolonged and consecutive droughts constitute a major constraint to development and threat 
to rural livelihoods in Somalia. Most of the regions typically affected by droughts are arid and semiarid 
areas that are low in resources and already under substantial ecological pressure under normal 
circumstances (Mutua and Balint 2009). Formal mechanisms to cope with shocks are unavailable because 
of lacking credit and insurance markets, and public safety nets are absent (Headey, Taffesse, and You 
2012). Hence, drought mitigation strategies are often limited to recourse to clan-based support, migration, 
and selling of productive assets (Dercon and Hoddinott 2004; Lybbert et al. 2004; Mogues 2011). 
However, the capacity of the traditional support system is very limited when major droughts strike, 
because drought is a large-area disaster, and therefore a large share of the population faces the same fate 
at the same time.3 Migration may involve costs related to transportation of people and assets, along with 
amplified competition over meager available resources, such as access to water and pasture.4 Destocking 
of herds is therefore the dominant and often only remaining strategy to avoid extreme poverty and hunger, 
but all too frequently it is of limited effectiveness and ends in a poverty trap (Carter and Barrett 2006; 
Carter et al. 2007; McPeak and Barrett 2001). 
  
                                                     
2 See Figure A.1 in the Appendix. 
3 Our drought data suggest that the spatial variation in the occurrence of droughts is low. Over the past 60 years (1950–
2009) Somalia’s 18 administrative regions experienced 6.3 drought months per year on average, with the least affected region at 
6.2 drought months and the most affected region at 6.5 drought months on average. See Section 3, “Methodology and Data,” for a 
detailed description of the underlying weather data and the calculation of the drought variables. 
4 Mutua and Balint (2009) note that during droughts local conflicts and fighting over water sources and grazing land surges, 
particularly when nomad communities move onto the lands of nonmobile communities and when different pastoral clans move to 
the same place and want to use the same scarce resources. Because of data limitations our empirical model cannot adequately 
account for increased competition over water and land resources due to drought-induced displacement as a driver of conflict. We 
therefore explore the robustness of our estimation results and discuss the underlying identifying assumptions in this regard. 
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Widespread poverty and lack of employment leave a breeding ground for recruitment of fighters 
into extremist groups like Al-Shabab (or other conflict parties), offering cash income and other benefits 
(Majid and McDowell 2012). Given these conditions, engaging in civil conflict to make one’s own living 
at the expense of others (either directly as a fighter or indirectly as a supporter of either party) may appear 
opportunistic for some people. Such self-seeking behavior tends to be amplified in times of unusual 
hardship—when experiencing serious income loss from droughts—and facilitated by the political 
economy of the stateless order as in most of Somalia (Mubarak 1997; Powell, Ford, and Nowrasteh 2008; 
Leeson 2007). Anecdotal evidence from the 2011–2012 famine supports this notion. For example, a 
representative of the United Nations Refugee Agency in Somalia states that “this [famine] has been a 
boon for Al-Shabab’s recruitment campaign because when you don’t have purchasing power to 
buy the food, you will be encouraged to be recruited because then you will be saved, and you can 
use that salary or you could be given food” (Heilprin 2011). Moreover, interviews with Al-
Shabab deserters reveal that the Islamist militia uses cash payments and promises regular salary 
for recruitment in combination with threats of force (Baldauf and Mohamed 2010). 
Conflict and Drought Frequency 
Both violent conflicts and droughts have drastically increased in Somalia in recent years. Data from the 
Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED 2011) show that violent conflicts have erupted 
more frequently since 2002. Between 1997 and 2009, violence outbreaks fall into two particular 
periods—from mid-2003 to mid-2004, and from 2007 onward—with several peaks of more than 80 
events per month. These high-intensity conflict periods overlap with periods of major droughts.5 
Temperature data from the University of East Anglia Climate Research Unit (UEA-CRU 2011) suggest 
that Somalia’s longest drought period since the beginning of the 19th century lasted 23 months from late 
2002 to late 2004.6 Also the second conflict period came along with a major drought. The resulting 
famine affected 3.3 million people in 2008 (EM-DAT 2012). Although Somalia was hit frequently by 
major droughts in the 1970s and 1980s too, the impact of the more recent droughts on humanity has been 
much more devastating, as the number of affected people indicates (EM-DAT 2012). Overall, our drought 
data indicate a clear trend toward more frequent, longer-lasting, and more intense droughts across 
Somalia: The number of drought months per year, the number of consecutive drought months, and the 
monthly temperature deviations from the long-term trend have significantly increased in all 18 
administrative regions, particularly over the past 30 years. 
The Livestock Market Channel 
Droughts cause herders to sell more of their livestock than they would sell under normal conditions 
because of either livestock fodder and water shortages or insufficient household income to cope with 
rising staple food prices (Abebe et al. 2008; Morton and Barton 2002). The liquidation of herds can be 
expected to follow an empirical, egoistic rationale, considering a variety of interconnected factors such as 
available fodder and water capacities, livestock sale prices, herd restocking requirements, and capacities 
of smoothing household consumption (McPeak 2006). The fact that drought is a recurring feature in 
Somalia’s climate and a slow-onset and large-area disaster has several important implications for herders’ 
decisions on when to sell, how many animals to sell, and which ones to sell. 
First, herders know well that fodder and water shortages may kill at least some of their animals, 
usually the weaker ones first. These animals may also be those that are less preferential genetically for 
restocking after the drought (such as those with lower milk and meat yields, fertility, and drought 
resistance) (Aklilu and Catley 2009; Aklilu and Wekesa 2002). Hence, selling these animals as early as 
                                                     
5 See Figure A.2 in the Appendix. See Section 3, “Methodology and Data,” for a detailed description of the conflict data. 
6 See Section 3, “Methodology and Data,” for a detailed description of the underlying weather data and the calculation of the 
drought variables. 
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possible might appear intuitive. Second, lean animals, however, reach lower prices than well-fattened 
ones, and only the well-fattened animals can be sold for export, while the local demand for livestock and 
meat might even collapse during times of widespread food shortage. Herding the animals to the market 
over long distances during drought reduces weights further—possibly below the minimum acceptable 
price (and may even kill some)—while transportation of herds by truck is often unaffordable. Third, given 
empty or thin local livestock markets after droughts and lacking cash liquidity because of missing credit 
and finance markets, herders may try to hold on to a large herd size as long as possible to maintain a 
sufficient number of animals for fast restocking after drought. Important to note in this context, herd size 
is critical and determines the herding system and hence the way of living (Devereux 2006; Lybbert et al. 
2004). For the Somali region in neighboring Ethiopia, Lybbert et al. (2004) found a threshold level for 
cattle herds at an unstable equilibrium of 10–15 animals for a typical transhumant herder household of 
6.0–6.5 members. Accordingly, 2-plus cattle per household member are necessary to sustain the 
opportunistic, spatially flexible herding associated with extensive pastoralism. When a household’s herd 
size falls below this threshold level, it effectively switches to a sendentarized herding system that, 
however, is much more vulnerable to spatiotemporal variability in rainfall and provides lower returns. 
Hence, maintaining a herd of any size becomes then exceedingly difficult so that sedentarization with a 
small herd corresponds to dire poverty in pastoralist communities (Lybbert et al. 2004). Indeed, 
agropastoralists are particularly vulnerable to droughts mainly because of their inability to reach water 
sources and sufficient grazing land during droughts (Headey, Taffesse, and You 2012). 
Finally, the slow onset of droughts may give herders time to choose their preferred coping 
strategy, but the large spatial spread of droughts not only limits herders’ options but may also induce a 
similar, contemporaneous behavior that adversely affects the majority of herders.7 For example, consider 
that herders’ preferred strategy is to maintain their herd size as long as possible in the hope of a short 
drought period. When the drought becomes more severe, an increasing number of herders are forced to 
sell their livestock at the same time and to accept a lower price due to market oversupply of thin animals. 
The depression of livestock market prices in turn reduces herders’ income and hence purchasing power, 
which is already diminished by high staple food prices. The deterioration of cattle body conditions during 
the 2010–2011 drought, for example, led to a drop in cattle prices in southern Somalia by 30–50 percent 
within four months (September–December 2010), while cereal prices spiked by 50–60 percent. As a 
result, the purchasing power in the southern regions plummeted by 40–60 percent at the end of 2010 from 
the previous year level (FSNAU 2011a). 
                                                     
7 In contrast, floods occur much more rapidly, and the damage is much more localized. The effects on the livestock market 
can therefore be expected to fundamentally differ from the effects of drought and may be less pronounced overall. This, in 
addition to the scope of the disasters’ impacts on humanity in the Somali context, induced us to limit our study to the analysis of 
droughts. 
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3.  METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Identification Strategy 
Our estimation of the effects of drought on civil conflicts through livestock price shocks follows a clear 
identification strategy. We begin by estimating the cross-sectional and intertemporal variation in the 
incidence of violent conflict events as a function of drought (hereafter referred to as reduced-form 
function) to detect a potential conflict–drought relationship and to quantify its strength implied by our 
data. Given that we find a statistically significant relationship, we then explore the possible channel 
through which droughts translate into conflict outbreaks, assuming that people’s motivation to participate 
in violent conflicts is essentially driven by economic means. Along with Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 
(2004), we adopt the opportunity costs approach according to which income losses—caused by an 
external shock, for example—lower the opportunity costs of the affected people for engaging in conflict 
activities. Hence the decisional factor of the individual’s behavior is the current household income from 
ordinary activities relative to the expected income from conflict participation. Because of the large 
contribution of livestock husbandry to (rural) income earnings and lacking income (and consumption 
expenditure) data, we use changes in livestock prices as proxy for changes in household incomes. We use 
livestock prices for export quality instead of prices for local quality, because the former tend to be less 
influenced by the local meat demand.8 Our hypothesis that producer prices of key exports matter for 
conflict is generally supported by Brückner and Ciccone (2010), who found that civil wars in Africa south 
of the Sahara (SSA) are more likely to erupt after downturns in the international price of the countries’ 
main export commodities. At the subnational level, Dube and Vargas (2008) show for Colombia that the 
price of labor-intensive agricultural products affects conflict primarily through losses in opportunity costs. 
The authors found that the sharp fall in international coffee prices during the late 1990s led to increased 
violence in coffee-dependent municipalities. 
To coherently estimate the effects of drought on conflicts transmitted through changes in 
livestock prices, we use a two-stage estimation framework. The challenge of our identification strategy is 
to isolate this livestock market channel from all other possible channels of transmission. Since we may 
not be able to fully exclude all other potential channels due to lacking data, we perform a comprehensive 
set of robustness checks to our preferred model specification and validity tests of our identifying 
assumptions. 
Our empirical model requires dealing with endogeneity and potential problems of omitted 
variables and measurement errors. The causality between conflict and economic variables may run into 
both directions such that income shocks increase the likelihood of conflict (as outlined above), and 
conflict exposure can be a shock to income earnings. For example, conflicts may diminish or destroy 
productive assets such as livestock herds through theft and transportation infrastructure through sabotage, 
leading to higher producer prices (Blattman and Annan 2010; Bundervoet 2010; Verpoorten 2009). 
Devereux (2006) reports that looting of livestock is a common instrument of conflict in the Somali region 
of neighboring Ethiopia. A standard solution to address the endogeneity problem in econometric 
estimations is an instrumental variable approach. Weather-related variables such as changes in 
temperature or precipitation appear to be plausible instruments for changes in household income and 
prices of agricultural products in subsistence-based economies. Omitted variable biases may arise from 
                                                     
8 Livestock prices—especially for export quality—can be expected to be largely supply driven in Somalia. Domestic and 
foreign demand for livestock is fairly stable throughout the year except before Muslim Eid festivals. For example, export data 
from Bosaaso and Berbera ports—the main ports for export of live animals—show that the number of exported sheep and goats 
during the Hajj month in 2009 increased more than fivefold compared with the average of the previous three months, while the 
export of cattle increased less than twofold (FSNAU 2011a). Over the past two decades, two major demand-side shocks had 
important knock-on effects on the livestock sector in the Horn of Africa. Because of an outbreak of the Rift Valley Fever and 
concerns about inappropriate health screening, Saudi Arabia—the major importer of livestock from Somalia—imposed a ban on 
livestock imports from eastern Africa from February 1998 to April 1999, reestablished the ban in September 2000, and lifted it in 
November 2009, before the Hajj. 
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unobserved factors that affect both our proxy for household incomes (livestock prices) and the conflict 
variable. Examples include historical grievances among and between pastoralist and agropastoralist 
communities, social or ethnic fragmentation of the population, population density, institutional 
conditions, transportation infrastructure, geography, and so on. Certainly, potential measurement errors in 
the data are a general concern of model specification and particularly so in Somalia. 
We address the potential problem of omitted or unobserved variables in a general manner by 
controlling for region- and time-fixed effects in both the reduced-form estimation and the two-stage 
estimation. The region-fixed effects pick up time-constant, unobserved heterogeneity across regions, 
including region-specific factors of conflict and livestock market pricing such as colonial vestiges, ethnic 
composition of the population, and market structure. The time-fixed effects control for external shocks 
that affect all of Somalia similarly, such as Saudi Arabia’s livestock import ban (imposed in 2000 and 
lifted in 2009). 
Estimation Framework 
The reduced-form regression has the following estimation equation: 
 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑐 +  𝛼𝑖 +  𝜙𝑡 + 𝜂 𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 . (1) 
The dependent variable in Equation (1) is the number of violent conflict events in Somalia’s 
administrative region 𝑖 during the year–month time period t (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡). The main deterministic variable 
(𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑡) identifies droughts, with high and positive value indicating severe droughts. Region-fixed 
effects are captured by a vector of region-identifying dichotomous variables (𝛼𝑖). Time-fixed effects enter 
through a vector of dichotomous variables specific to each time period in the sample (𝜙𝑡). The term 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is 
a disturbance term; the disturbances are allowed to be correlated across time periods for the same 
administrative region. The model works in differences and therefore explains variations within regions 
over time (that is, deviations from the regional means) rather than cross-sectional differences in levels. 
Hence it indicates what drives variations in conflicts rather than what causes conflicts. 
The conflict–drought relationship implied by Equation (1) is decomposed into two stages, with 
livestock prices as a factor of transmission. Technically, we estimate an instrumental variable, two-stage 
least-squares, fixed-effects (IV-2SLS-FE) model with robust standard errors. The first-stage equation 
yields the effects of droughts on livestock prices and thereby provides statistical evidence on the strength 
of the weather variable as an instrument of livestock prices. The equation is as follows: 
 ln𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑐1 + 𝛼1𝑖 + 𝜙1𝑡 + 𝜗 𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖,𝑡 , (2) 
where 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 denotes the time- and region-specific livestock price index. The second-stage equation, 
which yields the effects of livestock prices on the number of conflict events, is then 
 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑐2 + 𝛼2𝑖 +  𝜙2𝑡 + 𝜓  ln𝑝𝑟𝚤𝑐𝑒𝚤,𝑡� + 𝜀2𝑖,𝑡. (3) 
Finally, we use the estimated coefficients to simulate changes in the number of conflict events and 
livestock prices, assuming two different scenarios of increasing drought. 
Data and Indicators 
Our estimations are based on monthly panel data by region compiled from three different sources. 
Somalia has 18 administrative regions, and the time frame of our analysis ranges from January 1997 to 
December 2009, yielding a total of 2,808 panel observations. The dependent variable is constructed as the 
sum of violent conflict events by administrative region per month, using the Armed Conflict Location and 
Event Dataset (ACLED 2011). A conflict event is defined as a single altercation where force is often used 
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by one or more groups for a political end (Raleigh et al. 2010). For Somalia as a whole, ACLED reports 
4,260 conflicts, of which 3,870 events were violent (including battles between groups and violence 
against civilians), between 1997 and 2009. 
The drought variable—the deterministic exogenous variable in our model—is constructed from 
climatic data provided by the Climatic Research Unit at the University of East Anglia (UEA-CRU). The 
UEA-CRU (2011) time-series datasets (CRU-TS3.1) report month-by-month variations in temperature 
and precipitation available for the periods 1901–2009 and 1983–2009, respectively. They are calculated 
on high-resolution grids (0.5 × 0.5 degree or approximately 56km × 56km at the equator) based on 
measurements from weather stations distributed around the world (Harris et al. 2012; Mitchell and Jones 
2005). We use temperature instead of precipitation in our preferred model specification, because 
temperature variations appear to better explain past spatial and temporal variation in agricultural yields 
and economic output on the African continent (for example, Dell, Jones, and Olken 2012; Lobell, 
Schlenker, and Costa-Roberts 2011; Schlenker and Lobell 2010). Temperature data are available from the 
UEA-CRU for monthly averages of daily maximum and daily mean temperatures. We aggregate the 
gridded temperature data points to one (centered) data point by region using spatial interpolation (kriging, 
inbuilt in ESRI ArcGIS). Consistent with studies on extreme climates (for example, IPCC 2012), we use 
monthly averages of daily maximum temperatures in our preferred model specification (which give the 
highest temperatures in the daytime, causing the highest evaporation). 
From these temperature data we construct a drought index that directly enters our estimations. In 
fact, no universal definition of drought is applicable; it is rather defined in a differential manner. Drought 
needs to be distinguished from high temperature or low rainfall as such; it is rather characterized by a 
deviation from normal weather conditions. Hence, drought differs from aridity. Drought is a temporary 
weather aberration, whereas aridity is a stable climatic condition. Accordingly, we define drought months 
as months with temperatures above the long-term maximum temperatures, while the reference period in 
our preferred model specification is 1950–2009. A valid drought index must account not only for the 
magnitude of deviation and the length of successive periods of abnormal temperatures but also for the 
cumulative effect that makes successive drought periods with temperature extremes a severe drought. In 
addition, to exclude any potential source of endogeneity from our model, we searched for a drought index 
that does not include components influenced by human activity and hence possibly conflict, such as soil 
characteristics, water availability, or vegetation.9 Balint and Mutua (2011) developed such an index, 
tested its performance using data from Somalia and Kenya even under temperate continental climate 
conditions, and applied it for drought monitoring in Somalia. We use their Temperature Drought Index 
(TDI) in a slightly modified form. 
For each administrative region, 𝑖, the TDI by time period, 𝑡, (year [𝑦] × month [𝑚]) is calculated 
as follows 
 :𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡 =  𝑇𝐷𝐼𝑦,𝑚𝑃  =  � 𝑅𝑦,𝑚𝑇1
𝑛
∑ 𝑅𝑚,𝑘𝑇𝑛𝑘=1    ∗    ∑ 𝑇𝑦,(𝑚−𝑙+1)𝑃𝑙=11𝑛∑ �∑ 𝑇(𝑚−𝑙+1),𝑘𝑃𝑙=1 �𝑛𝑘=1  . (4) 
In Equation (4), 𝑃 denotes the reference period, comprising the current month, 𝑚, (of the current 
year, 𝑦) and preceding months. We chose a period length of three months in our preferred model 
specification (indicated as TDI3), because it is usually the maximum length of the two rainy seasons and 
approximately half of the main dry season in Somalia. The first term of the TDI measures the maximum 
number of successive months with temperatures, 𝑇, above the long-term average temperature during the 
current reference period (𝑅𝑦,𝑚𝑇 ) relative to the long-term average number of successive drought months 
considered normal for this time of the year (1
𝑛
∑ 𝑅𝑚,𝑘𝑇𝑛𝑘=1 ). The time frame for calculating the long-term 
averages is 1950–2009 (𝑛 = 59 years) in our preferred model specification. The second term of the TDI 
                                                     
9 This condition leaves most common drought indexes, such as the Palmer Drought Severity Index (Palmer 1965), 
unsuitable. 
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measures the deviation of the temperature averaged over the current reference period (∑ 𝑇𝑦,(𝑚−𝑙+1)𝑃𝑙=1 ) 
from the long-term average temperature considered normal for the period at this time of the year 
(1
𝑛
∑ �∑ 𝑇(𝑚−𝑙+1),𝑘𝑃𝑙=1 �𝑛𝑘=1 ). Hence, the second term of the TDI captures the intensity of drought and is 
weighted by the first term, giving higher weights to successive drought months than to intermittent 
drought months. 
Livestock price data for Somalia are available from the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis 
Unit database (FSNAU 2011b). In our preferred model specification, we use monthly market prices for 
living cattle of export quality by region for constructing the deterministic endogenous variable. We 
replaced missing price data by the price of the nearest region (from a maximum of the three closest 
regions) in the same month. About 36 percent of the maximum panel observations are imputed, while 
tests confirm that the imputation did not significantly alter our estimation results. We normalize livestock 
prices by dividing prices with local market prices of (imported) gasoline to control for regional price 
inflation and thus to obtain a better measure of local purchasing power. The normalization also makes 
prices reported in different currencies comparable, given that reported currency conversion rates appear to 
be flawed. Again, tests reveal no evidence that the normalization leads to biased estimates. The 
normalized livestock prices enter our estimations in logarithms, easing interpretation.10 
                                                     
10 Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the preferred model specification are reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
Given the relatively long time frame of our analysis (of 13 years), a matter of concern may be that the time series in the variables 
used are nonstationary, which can lead to spurious results in the sense that they indicate a relationship between variables where 
one does not exist. The statistics of the Fisher test for unit roots in panel data (proposed by Maddala and Wu 1999) reported in 
Table A.1 reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity in all variables at any reasonable confidence level. We also note that, at the 
cost of removing relevant variations, all results of our preferred model specifications and the ones presented in the Appendix are 
robust to the addition of a region-specific time trend variable (with the exception of the district-level estimations). 
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4.  ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Our estimation results provide strong evidence that more droughts lead to more violent civil conflicts in 
Somalia and that drought-induced cattle price shocks drive conflict outbreaks. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show 
the estimated coefficients of the reduced-form regression and two-stage regression, respectively, for our 
preferred model specifications. The coefficient of the Temperature Drought Index (TDI) in the reduced-
form regression indicates that a one-point increase in the severity of a drought period gives rise to 1.4 
additional conflict outbreaks on average. The coefficients of the two-stage regression suggest that this 
increase in drought severity brings down cattle prices by 12 percent, while a 100 percent price drop 
increases the number of conflicts by almost 12. 
Table 4.1—Reduced-form regression results (preferred model specification) 
Dependent variable Number of conflicts 
Drought (TDI3) 1.413 *** 
 (0.372) 
F-value 2.47 *** 
R-squared 0.128 
Number of regions 18 
Observations 2,808 
Source:  Authors’ estimation based on ACLED 2011 and UEA-CRU 2011. 
Notes:  *** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficient 
estimates for region-fixed and time-fixed effects are not reported. TDI3 = Temperature Drought Index, with 3-month 
reference period. 
Table 4.2—Two-stage regression results (preferred model specification) 
  Stage 1 Stage 2 
Dependent variable Cattle price (log) Number of conflicts 
Drought (TDI3) –0.123 ***   
 (0.037)  
Cattle price (log)   –11.85 *** 
    (4.187) 
F-value 8.47 ***     
R-squared 0.302  
Number of regions 18 
Observations 2,335 
Underidentification test1 11.84 ***     
Weak identification test2 11.15   
Root mean square error     5.145 
Source:  Authors’ estimation based on ACLED 2011, UEA-CRU 2011, and FSNAU 2011b. 
Notes:  *** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Coefficient estimates for region-fixed and time-fixed effects are not reported. TDI3 = Temperature Drought Index, with 
3-month reference period. 
1 Kleibergen-Paap rank LM statistic (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2007; Kleibergen and Paap 2006. The test statistic 
strongly rejects the null hypothesis of underidenfication. 
2 Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2007; Kleibergen and Paap 2006). The test 
statistic rejects the null hypothesis of weak identification at least at the 15 percent level, based on the critical values 
provided by Stock and Yogo (2005). 
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Table 4.3 shows the changes in the number of conflict events and cattle prices under two 
scenarios. In the first scenario we arbitrarily assume that rising drought frequency and intensity lead to an 
increase of the TDI with 3-month reference period (TDI3) by one standard deviation (equivalent to 33 
percent on average). The TDI3 increase translates into a 4 percent decline of cattle prices, which in turn, 
leads to an increase in the number of conflict events by 0.5 (equivalent to 37 percent at the sample mean). 
In the second scenario we simulate an increase of the TDI3 due to monthly temperature rises varying 
around 3.2 degrees Celsius (equivalent to an average TDI3 increase by 49 percent).11 These changes in 
median temperatures are predictions by Christensen et al. (2007) that are likely to be present in eastern 
Africa by the end of the 21st century under the A1B scenario of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC). According to our model estimates, this TDI3 increase results in an increase of the 
number of conflict events by 0.8 (equivalent to 58 percent at the sample mean). Thus, temperature 
changes as predicted by the IPCC may increase the number of conflicts by more than half. 
Table 4.3—Simulation of the effects of increasing drought on cattle prices and conflicts 
Scenario TDI3 change 
Cattle price 
change 
Change in number 
of conflicts 
  Percent Percent Number Percent 
Increase of TDI3 by one standard 
deviation 32.6 –4.3 0.52 37.4 
Increase of TDI3 by temperature rise 
according to IPCC A1B scenario 49.0 –6.8 0.80 58.3 
Source:  Authors’ estimation based on ACLED 2011, UEA-CRU 2011, and FSNAU 2011b data and Christensen et al. 2007. 
Notes:  IPCC = Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, TDI3 = Temperature Drought Index, with 3-month reference 
period. Changes in cattle prices are based on the estimated coefficient of the first stage of the two-stage regression, and 
changes in the number of conflict events are calculated based on the estimated coefficient of the second stage of the two-
stage regression. Percent changes are reported at the sample mean for the time frame of our analysis (1997–2009). 
                                                     
11 Precisely, the predicted temperature rises—which we use in our simulation—are 3.1 degrees Celsius for September 
throughout February, 3.2 degrees Celsius for March to May, and 3.4 degrees Celsius for June to August. 
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5.  ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND IDENTIFYING ASSUMPTIONS 
Robustness of Estimation Results 
The results of our estimations may be sensitive to the specification of the empirical model. Therefore, we 
apply a comprehensive set of robustness checks to rule out potential disturbing effects systematically. We 
examined the robustness in terms of (1) the level of spatial aggregation, (2) alternative specifications of 
the dependent variable measuring conflict, (3) alternative specifications of the exogenous drought 
variable, (4) alternative specifications of the endogenous price variable, and (5) alternative specifications 
of the functional form. We pairwise compare our preferred model specification with these alternative 
modifications.12 
First, the estimation results are not altered by the choice of the level of spatial aggregation. We 
ran the reduced-form regression and two-stage regression using the same raw data but aggregate them at 
the district level instead of the region level.13 The estimated partial effects of a change in the Temperature 
Drought Index with 3-month reference period (TDI3) on the number of conflicts are quite similar to the 
ones from the region-level estimations, but the explanatory power of the district-level regressions is 
significantly lower.14 Due to missing market price data, coverage of the district-level sample for the two-
stage regression is only 69 percent of the maximum number of panel observations (even after applying the 
imputation method described above), compared with 83 percent in the region-level sample.15 Moreover, 
estimations at lower spatial aggregation levels come along with a substantially increased probability of 
spatial dependency between neighboring districts. This becomes apparent when introducing spatial lags of 
the TDI3 in the district-level estimation. The same modification of the region-level estimation gives no 
indication for such spatial spillovers.16 The smaller geographical and temporal coverage in combination 
with an increased spatial dependency may explain the lower explanatory power of the district-level 
regressions. 
Second, the results are highly robust to the definition of conflict for both the reduced-form and 
the two-stage regressions.17 Running the regressions with a dependent variable incorporating all types of 
conflict events as given in the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset, ACLED, (instead of violent 
conflicts only) changes neither the significance nor the coefficient estimates considerably. In addition, we 
ran the regressions with a dependent variable constructed from the database of the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (UCDP) at Uppsala University (UCDP 2011). UCDP (2011) adopted a more restrictive 
definition of violent conflict events than ACLED (2011) and therefore reports fewer conflict events. 
According to UCDP definition, violent civil conflict events are those with at least one death as a direct 
consequence of an (armed) intrastate strife (Sundberg, Lindgren, and Padskocimaite 2011). Nonetheless, 
the estimated effects are almost identical (in relative terms). For example, an increase of the TDI3 by one 
standard deviation and the equivalent decline in cattle prices by 4 percent translates into an increase in the 
number of conflicts by 44 percent according to the UCDP data-based estimation, compared with 38 
percent according to our preferred specification. However, the regressions based on UCDP data have 
lower explanatory power. 
Third, the definition of drought does not compromise our results. We checked the robustness of 
the conflict–drought relationship using numerous modifications of the drought variable in the first-stage 
regression. We first modified the TDI in terms of the length of the reference period starting from 1 month 
                                                     
12 Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the alternative model specifications (at the region level) are reported in Table 
A.1 in the Appendix. 
13 Somalia has 74 districts. 
14 See Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix. 
15 In the district-level sample about 53 percent of all price observations are imputed, compared to 36 percent in the region-
level sample. 
16 District-level regression results augmented with the TDI3 spatially lagged are not reported. The region-level regression 
results augmented with the TDI spatially lagged are discussed below and presented in Table A.13 in the Appendix. 
17 See Tables A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix. 
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up to 6 months as well as the length of the period for calculating long-term temperature averages, and we 
used monthly averages of mean daily temperatures instead of maximum daily temperatures and applied 
temperatures from an alternative data source.18 The alternative temperature data are taken from the 
Prediction of Worldwide Energy Resource (POWER) project of the US National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA). They are computed based on solar radiation derived from satellite observations 
in combination with meteorological data from an assimilation model (NASA 2011). We also checked the 
robustness of the regression results with a temperature anomaly index instead of the TDI3. The main 
findings are that all these modifications do not alter the estimated conflict–drought relationship of our 
preferred model specification considerably and that the preferred TDI3 yields a relatively high model fit. 
Next, we tested whether temperature changes, precipitation changes, or both better explain changes in 
violent conflicts in Somalia and, in particular, in livestock prices.19 We augmented the reduced-form and 
two-stage regressions with various modifications of Balint and Mutua’s (2011) Precipitation Drought 
Index (PDI)—which is constructed similar to the TDI—and with a precipitation anomaly index.20 The 
modifications of the precipitation-based indexes are consistent with the ones applied in the previous 
step.21 The main findings here are that temperature-based indicators perform better than precipitation-
based indicators—which confirms findings from previous studies (for example, Burke et al. 2009; Dell, 
Jones, and Olken 2009; Marchiori, Maystadt, and Schumacher 2012)—and anomaly indexes perform 
poorly. Although the coefficients of most PDI variations are statistically significant in the reduced-form 
regression, their partial effects are small compared with those of the TDI3 effect. Moreover, the 
coefficients of most PDI variations are statistically insignificant in the two-stage regression, and the 
partial effects of the significant PDI coefficients are even much smaller. Thus, temperature shocks drive 
conflict incidence and deterioration in livestock prices, while the estimated effects are robust to the 
inclusion of precipitation-based drought variables. A stronger responsiveness of livestock prices to 
changes in temperatures compared with changes in precipitation is consistent with findings from previous 
studies (for example, Seo and Mendelsohn 2007), too. 
Fourth, cattle prices are most responsive to drought; the normalization of prices does not 
compromise our estimation results. We performed robustness checks of the two-stage regressions using 
prices of cattle of different quality and prices of other common herd animals. Independent of the quality, 
cattle prices are responsive to changes in the TDI3, unlike prices of goat, sheep, and camel.22 The 
statistical insignificance of goat, sheep, and camel prices points to cattle prices as the only identifiable 
livestock market channel. A possible explanation is that goats, sheep, and especially camels are more 
drought resistant than cattle, so that the price shock of droughts can be better smoothened over time. In 
addition, the absorption capacity of the local livestock markets may be quite limited, and the demand for 
some livestock may be met earlier than for others, particularly in periods of drought. During drought the 
markets for some livestock—notably camel—may even fully collapse. Our robustness checks also show 
that the normalization of cattle prices by petroleum prices or prices of other ordinary, (solely) imported 
goods such as sugar or rice does not compromise the estimation results, but only their efficiency.23  
Fifth, modifications of the functional form of the two-stage regression reveal no evidence for the 
existence of time lags, spatial dependency, seasonality, and nonlinearity in our data or suggest that the 
resulting effects are unsystematic, small, and therefore negligible. Previous studies (for example, Miguel, 
                                                     
18 See Tables A.6 and A.7 in the Appendix. 
19 See Tables A.8 and A.9 in the Appendix. 
20 We reverse the PDI to make the interpretation of the direction of PDI changes consistent with TDI changes. Abnormally 
high temperatures and abnormally low rainfall lead to droughts. 
21 The temperature/precipitation anomaly index is the ratio of the difference between the average temperature/precipitation 
in the current month and the long-term temperature/precipitation average of this month (enumerator) and the long-term average 
standard deviation of monthly temperature/precipitation (denominator). Unlike the TDI and PDI, temperature and precipitation 
anomalies do not account for the cumulative effect of droughts. For the regression results with modifications of the drought 
variable, see Tables A6, A7, A8, and A9 in the Appendix. 
22 See Table A.10 in the Appendix. 
23 See Table A.11 in the Appendix. 
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Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004; Hendrix and Glaser 2007) point to delays in the response of prices and 
conflicts to weather shocks. To test for potential time lags in our data, we gradually augmented the two-
stage regression equations of our preferred model specification with the TDI3 in lags of one to five 
months comprising one agricultural season (including one rainy and one dry season of approximately 
three months each).24 We found some statistical evidence for a lagging effect of two to three months 
(comprising roughly one rainy/dry season) but not beyond three lags. Nonetheless, the second-stage 
coefficient estimates of all these modifications are quite similar to the estimate of our preferred 
specification, and the overall partial effect remains roughly constant, independent of the length of the 
lagging effect. Another point of concern is spatial dependency (Anselin 2002; Florax and Folmer 1992). 
Conceivably, drought in one part of the country may fuel conflicts in another part through an influx of 
herders and herds and the associated increased competition over scarce grazing land and water resources, 
for example. Ignoring such spatial dependencies can lead to underestimating the drought impact. 
Augmenting the preferred specification with the spatially lagged TDI3 does not reveal spatial 
dependencies in our data. The spatially lagged TDI3 turns out to be statistically insignificant and to not 
affect the critical coefficients.25 Yet it should be noted that the used Euclidean distance between the 
geographic centers of the regions is a crude proxy of the distance between origin and destination of cross-
region migration. More accurate approximations were impossible, given lacking georeferenced data of the 
location of herders under normal conditions and of common destinations in times of drought. Next, the 
response to abnormally high temperatures may also be different during dry seasons compared with rainy 
seasons. Augmenting the preferred two-stage regression equations with a dichotomous variable for the 
season and an interaction term between this variable and the TDI3 shows no differentiated seasonal 
effect.26 Finally, adding the TDI3 in squared terms to the preferred specification provides no evidence of 
nonlinearity in the drought–livestock price relationships, so that the specification of our model in linear 
terms remains our preferred one.27 
Validity of Identifying Assumptions 
Our strategy for identifying livestock price shocks as the driver of drought-induced conflicts rests on the 
validity of TDI3 variations as an instrument of livestock price changes. The test statistics in Table 4.2 
give indeed strong confidence in the validity of this assumption. The F-value of the first-stage regression 
is high (in a just-identified two-stage regression), which provides a first indication of the strength of the 
instrument. In addition, the weak instrumental variable test (developed by Kleibergen and Paap 2006) 
rejects the hypothesis of weak instruments at least at the 15 percent level. 
Next, our two-stage regression is built on the assumption that droughts—precisely, droughts as 
determined based on temperature measurements—increase conflicts only through changes in livestock 
prices. As shown above, the estimation results of the reduced-form and two-stage regressions are driven 
entirely by temperature variation and no other weather phenomena, notably precipitation. Even though the 
coefficients of some of the PDI modifications are statistically significant in the reduced-form regression, 
the coefficients of these PDI modifications in the two-stage regression are insignificant or the implied 
partial effects are quite small and therefore negligible.28 Hence we can rule out that precipitation variation 
affects livestock price changes considerably, but there may be additional conflict–drought channels other 
than livestock prices that may be also subject to precipitation variation. As argued in Section 2, changes 
in livestock prices provide an accurate proxy for changes in household incomes in Somalia, but we cannot 
completely rule out the possibility of other channels of transmission. It is therefore critical to 
                                                     
24 See Table A.12 in the Appendix. 
25 The spatially lagged TDI3s are constructed based on distance-based spatial matrices that weight the TDI3 of each region 
by the inverse of the Euclidean distance to the considered one. We test the TDI3 spatially lagged in order, one and two. For the 
regression results, see Table A.13 in the Appendix. 
26 See Table A.13 in the Appendix. 
27 See Table A.13 in the Appendix. 
28 See Tables A.8 and A.9 in the Appendix. 
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demonstrate—as much as the data allow—that the existence of other channels is unlikely to jeopardize 
our findings. Besides income from sales of herd animals, droughts may affect (nonherd) farm income and, 
in turn, influence the economic incentives to participate in conflict. In the absence of farm income data, 
we test the validity of our exclusion restriction by incorporating an additional instrumental variable in the 
equations of both stages of our preferred two-stage regression specification, which we expect to affect 
conflicts through no other channel than livestock price changes. Hence, we create an overidentified 
model.29 The added price index determines the exposure of Somali herders to international livestock 
prices.30 Following Angrist and Pischke (2009), we also test the robustness of the results under 
overidentifying restrictions using the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimator, which 
is approximately median unbiased for overidentified models. Yet the estimation results of all augmented 
regressions do not reveal any channel of transmission other than livestock prices. That is, the test for 
overidentification fails to reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation between the two instrumental 
variables and the error term. 
Participation in conflicts may also be motivated by changing economic factors other than 
livestock prices such as wage losses and spiking consumer prices of main staple foods. In addition, 
changes in these factors may be associated more with precipitation variation than with temperature 
variation. To test these channels, we augmented our preferred two-stage regression specification at both 
the first and the second stages with the PDI3 and variables such as wage rates of causal labor in 
agriculture and consumer prices of wheat flour, maize, red sorghum, and rice.31 All these modifications 
do not alter the TDI3 coefficient estimates considerably, if the coefficients are statistically significant at 
all. The stability of the TDI3 coefficient estimates indicates a high level of confidence in the validity of 
the exclusion restriction of our instrumental variable approach. 
Another possible violation of the exclusion restriction can emerge from humanitarian assistance 
delivered in response to drought-caused food shortages. Over the time frame of our analysis, humanitarian 
assistance in Somalia was provided mostly in the form of food aid, which can be expected to be targeted 
to the disaster areas. The distribution of (staple) foods may theoretically contribute to an increase in the 
demand for meat as a result of freeing up household resources destined for food purchases. However, the 
resulting income effect can be assumed to be minor, considering that most food aid recipients are 
suffering from severe acute malnutrition and do not hold enough purchasing power to afford meat 
consumption anyway. Food aid delivered prior to a drought—which seems to be quite rare, even in the 
case of famine early warnings (Hillbruner and Moloney 2012; Lautze et al. 2012)—may smoothen the 
liquidation of herds through reducing herders’ immediate necessity to sell livestock for purchasing food, 
                                                     
29 See Table A.14 in the Appendix. 
30 The exposure to international livestock prices is determined by the proximity from the considered region to the port for 
livestock exports combined with the importance of cattle exports relative to other livestock exports through that port. Precisely, 
we determine the proximity as the inverse of the Euclidian distance from the geographical center of the region to the nearest 
major livestock export port. The two major livestock ports are located in Berbera and Bosaaso in northern Somalia. The share of 
cattle exports on total ruminant exports serves as proxy of the degree of relative exposure of the cattle prices in this port (and 
hence in the dependent regions) to international cattle prices. The index measuring the exposure of the region, 𝑖, to international 
cattle prices is constructed for each month, 𝑚, and year, 𝑦, as follows: 
𝑃𝑖,𝑚,𝑦 =  𝑤𝑖,𝑐 𝑝𝑐,𝑚,𝑦 , with  𝑤𝑖,𝑐 =  1𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖ℎ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ,𝑐∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ,𝑙3𝑙=1  , 
where 𝑤𝑖,𝑐 is the region-specific weight for cattle, and 𝑝𝑐,𝑚,𝑦 is the international price for beef, as available from the Primary 
Commodity database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2011). Entering the weight, the variables 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ,𝑐 and 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ,𝑙 
give the total number of head of cattle, 𝑐, and the livestock species, 𝑙, through port, ℎ, between January 1994 and December 
1996, as provided by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit—Somalia (FSNAU 2011a). The livestock species considered 
are goats (and sheep), cattle, and camels. We chose the time period of 1994–1996 because it is prior to the time frame of our 
analysis and therefore strictly exogenous. As a robustness check, we also estimated all model specifications with an extended 
reference period ranging from January 1994 to December 2010. The estimation results are very similar and therefore not 
reported. 
31 See Table A.15 in the Appendix. The wage and food price variables enter the regression as lags to avoid potential 
problems of simultaneity. 
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which may reflect slower declines of livestock prices. Yet to have a significant effect on livestock prices, 
food aid would have to be of multiple quantities as typically delivered and to be targeted perfectly in 
terms of time and space, and herders would have to be major beneficiaries (despite their relative asset 
wealth). Past experiences do not support these conditions in Somalia, and previous studies revealed rather 
weak links between volumes of food aid delivered and market price movements in general (for example, 
Dorosh, del Ninni, and Sahn 1995; Kirwan and McMillan 2007; Mabuza et al. 2009). Moreover, it can be 
ruled out realistically that people’s expectation of receiving food aid in times of emergency affects 
consumer (and producer) behavior, given the well-known shortcomings of food aid delivery. Cushioning 
effects to livestock price declines through deferred liquidation of herds as a result of food aid diverted to 
livestock feed can be assumed to be insignificant, too, because (most) food aid recipients are in dire need 
to consume the food themselves and hold few or no livestock (anymore); handout quantities are barely 
sufficient to stave off hunger among humans, let alone livestock; and food handouts come often in 
inappropriate form for feeding livestock (for example, flour). Hence, distortions of livestock prices due to 
food aid can be expected to be rather minor (if measurable at all). 
However, legitimate concerns exist—particularly in Somalia—that food aid has been misused to 
feed and compensate fighters, to attract new fighters, to buy loyalty among the impoverished population, 
or to exchange for military equipment and may contribute to an expansion and intensification of conflict 
(for example, Anderson 1999; Nunn and Qian 2012; Collier and Hoeffler 2007). On the contrary, 
humanitarian assistance has also been argued to reduce the likelihood of conflict participation for earning 
a living, which becomes particularly relevant under circumstances of lacking alternative sources of 
livelihood such as in times of hardship triggered by natural disasters or conflicts (Bas and Coe 2011; 
Gilligan and Hoddinott 2007). If the former, the fueling effect of food aid on conflict, dominates the 
latter, the opportunity income effect, our analysis provides lower-bound estimates of the true impact of 
livestock prices on conflict. Unfortunately, lacking data on food aid prevents us from testing the 
relationship between conflict and food aid in Somalia.  
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6.  CONCLUSIONS 
As a result of climate change, extreme weather events are predicted to become more frequent and more 
severe globally and in the Horn of Africa. Evidence suggests that climate change has contributed to the 
increasing occurrence of major droughts in the Horn of Africa and particularly Somalia, which are 
expected to further rise in frequency and intensity throughout this century. In addition to the human 
suffering from the immediate impacts of climate change, weather extremes—and therewith climate 
change—increase the risk of civil conflict, putting an additional burden to human well-being and 
economic development. Sparking some controversy, the causality between weather variations and 
increased risk of conflict has been demonstrated at the global and regional levels and for the long term by 
several previous studies (for example, Burke et al. 2009; Hsiang, Meng, and Cane 2011; O’Loughlin et al. 
2012). In this paper, first we showed that this causality is valid also for a single country—Somalia—at the 
local level, and over a relatively short period of time (namely, 13 years). 
This finding has important policy implications. Recognizing the conflict–drought relationship 
implies that policies and investments for drought impact mitigation and resilience building are critical for 
both climate change adaptation and conflict prevention in Somalia. Such measures should be targeted 
primarily toward drought-prone areas that are at particular risk of civil conflict. The costs of inaction go 
beyond the immediate economic and environmental costs of climate change and may involve substantial 
costs from intensified conflict activities including civilian casualties, destruction of infrastructure, and 
loss of economic growth potential, which have been largely ignored in estimations of climate change 
costs. 
The second main finding of our analysis is that factors of economic well-being are indeed key 
determinants of individuals’ participation in conflict and, in consequence, that poverty alleviation is an 
effective strategy for conflict mitigation in Somalia. On the contrary, if no action is taken, the poverty–
conflict trap is likely to deepen in the course of progressing climate change. Innovatively, our analysis 
shows that local livestock markets are an important channel through which droughts fuel conflict in 
Somalia and that plummeting livestock producer prices and hence losses in livestock income lower 
Somalis’ resistance to engage in conflict activities. Therefore, increasing these opportunity costs among 
pastoralists and semipastoralists through fostering growth in the livestock sector, providing alternative 
income-earning opportunities, and establishing social safety nets, for example, reduces people’s economic 
incentives for participating in conflicts. Similarly, investments in rural transportation infrastructure and in 
the livestock sector can help to smoothen the liquidation of herds and therewith to mitigate the rapid 
deterioration of livestock prices and household income losses. Other potentially effective measures 
include weather insurance and financial and technical support to adjust herds toward more drought-
resistant and more fast-marketable animals. 
However, this list of possible actions also reveals the limitations of our analysis in proposing 
specific policy recommendations. Critical knowledge gaps remain regarding the effectiveness of feasible 
policies and investments to strengthen resilience in pastoralist and semipastoralist livelihoods in Somalia 
and in other countries facing similar vulnerabilities. Quantitative research in this direction suffers from 
the absence of standard economic data. Another limitation of our analysis may be related to the external 
validity of the results. Certainly, Somalia may be considered an extreme case in terms of length and 
intensity of civil war and droughts, but Sahel countries such as Mali, Chad, Niger, and Sudan have seen 
increasing civil conflicts and droughts, too, and can serve as study sites for validating our findings. 
Nonetheless, this paper provides strong evidence of the relationship between civil conflict and climate 
change at the local level and the relevance of economic behavior in this context.  
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APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure A.1—Number of violent conflicts by administrative region, 1997–2009 
 
Source:  Authors’ presentation based on ACLED 2011. 
Figure A.2—Frequency of conflict and drought events by month, nationwide in Somalia 
 
Source:  Authors’ presentation based on ACLED 2011 and UEA-CRU 2011. 
Note:  See Section 3, “Methodology and Data,” for the identification of drought months. 
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Table A.1—Descriptive statistics and unit root test statistics 
  Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Fisher unit 
root test 
statistic 
Preferred model specification        
Number of violent conflicts (ACLED data; 1997–2009) 2,808 1.38 4.96 0.00 79.00 842.34 *** 
Price of cattle of export quality (in logs; normalized by gasoline price) 2,335 5.25 0.48 3.31 6.98 213.76 *** 
Temperature Drought Index with 3-month reference period (TDI3) 
(UEA-CRU data; daily maximum temperature; long-term average: 
1950–2009) 
2,808 1.13 0.35 0.00 1.58 715.59 *** 
Alternative model specifications (selected variables)        
Number of violent conflicts (UCDP data; 1997–2009) 2,808 0.39 1.84 0.00 28.00 828.78 *** 
Temperature Drought Index with 6-month reference period (TDI6) 
(UEA-CRU data; daily maximum temp.; long-term average: 1950–2009) 2,808 1.14 0.30 0.00 1.65 436.57 *** 
Temperature Drought Index with 3-month reference period (TDI3) 
(UEA-CRU data; daily mean temp.; long-term average: 1950–2009) 2,808 1.09 0.39 0.00 1.63 671.14 *** 
Temperature Drought Index with 3-month reference period (TDI3) 
(UEA-CRU data; daily maximum temp.; long-term average: 1901–2009) 2,808 1.15 0.38 0.00 1.71 691.71 *** 
Temperature Drought Index with 3-month reference period (TDI3) 
(NASA data; daily maximum temp.; long-term average: 1997–2007) 2,340 0.88 0.50 0.00 1.85 534.61 *** 
Precipitation Drought Index with 3-month reference period (PDI3) (EA-
CRU data; long-term average: 1983–2009)1 2,808 –0.51 0.54 –2.18 0.00 462.95 *** 
Temperature anomaly (EA-CRU data; long-term average: 1950–2009) 2,808 0.40 0.82 –3.51 3.28 886.73 *** 
Rainfall anomaly (EA-CRU data; long-term average: 1983–2009) 2,808 –0.25 0.62 –3.92 1.96 912.61 *** 
Price of cattle of local quality (in logs; normalized by gasoline price) 2,417 4.86 0.50 2.91 6.74 146.24 *** 
Price of goat of export quality (in logs; normalized by gasoline price) 2,464 3.61 0.37 2.37 5.74 187.62 *** 
Price of cattle of export quality (in logs; no normalization) 2,531 14.29 0.69 11.70 16.47 24.55  
Price of cattle of export quality (in logs; normalized by sugar price) 2,511 5.44 0.45 3.28 7.11 245.06 *** 
Price of cattle of export quality (in logs; normalized by rice price) 2,524 5.48 0.45 3.31 6.94 236.70 *** 
Source:  Authors’ calculation based on ACLED 2011, FSNAU 2011b, NASA 2011, UCDP 2011, and UEA-CRU 2011. 
Notes:  *** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. TDI = Temperature Drought Index. 
1 The time frame is March 1997 to December 2007. 
 20 
 
Table A.2—Reduced-from regression results of alternative model specification, district-level 
estimation 
Level of aggregation Region District 
Dependent variable Number of conflicts Number of conflicts 
Drought (TDI3) 1.413 *** 0.327 *** 
 (0.372) (0.089) 
F-value 2.47 *** 2.39 *** 
R-squared 0.128 0.019 
Number of regions/districts 18 74 
Observations 2,808 11,544 
Source:  Authors’ estimation based on ACLED 2011, and UEA-CRU 2011. 
Note:  *** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficient 
estimates for region-fixed and time-fixed effects are not reported. TDI = Temperature Drought Index. 
Table A.3—Two-stage regression results of alternative model specification, district-level estimation 
Level of aggregation Region   District 
 Stage 1 Stage 2  Stage 1 Stage 2 
Dependent variable Cattle price (log) Number of conflicts   Cattle price (log) 
Number of 
conflicts 
Drought (TDI3) –0.123 ***    –0.080 ***   
 (0.037)   (0.021)  
Cattle price (log)   –11.85 ***    –4.79 *** 
    (4.187)     (1.684) 
F-value 8.47 ***       21.57 ***     
R-squared 0.302   0.220  
Number of regions 18  74 
Observations 2,335   8,562 
Underidentification test1 11.84 ***       14.83 ***     
Weak identification test2 11.15    14.53   
Root mean square error     5.145       2.725 
Source:  Authors’ estimation based on ACLED 2011, FSNAU 2011b, and UEA-CRU 2011. 
Note:  *** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Coefficient estimates for region-fixed and time-fixed are not reported. TDI = Temperature Drought Index. 
1 Kleibergen-Paap rank LM statistic (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2007; Kleibergen and Paap 2006). The test statistic 
strongly rejects the null hypothesis of underidenfication. 
2 Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2007; Kleibergen and Paap 2006). 
Table A.4—Reduced-form regression results of alternative model specification, conflict definition 
Conflict data ACLED (violent conflicts) ACLED (all conflicts) UCDP (violent conflicts) 
Dependent variable Number of conflicts Number of conflicts Number of conflicts 
Drought (TDI3) 1.413 *** 1.588 *** 0.255 *** 
 (0.372) (0.378) (0.138) 
F-value 2.47 *** 2.94 *** 1.33 *** 
R-squared 0.128 0.148 0.073 
Source:  Authors’ estimation based on ACLED 2011, UCDP 2011, and UEA-CRU 2011. 
Note:  *** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficient 
estimates for region-fixed and time-fixed effects are not reported. TDI = Temperature Drought Index, ACLED = Armed 
Conflict Location and Event Dataset, UCDP = Uppsala Conflict Data Program. 
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Table A.5—Two-stage regression results of alternative model specification, conflict definition 
Conflict data ACLED (violent conflicts) ACLED (all conflicts) UCDP (violent conflicts) 
  Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 
Dependent variable Cattle price (log) Number of conflicts Cattle price (log) 
Number of 
conflicts Cattle price (log) 
Number of 
conflicts 
Drought (TDI3) –0.123 ***   –0.123 ***   –0.123 ***   
 (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037)  
Cattle price (log)   –11.85 ***   –13.39 ***   –3.88 *** 
    (4.187)   (4.567)   (1.594) 
F-value 8.47 ***     8.47 ***     8.47 ***     
R-squared 0.302  0.302  0.302  
Underidentification test1 11.84 ***     11,836 ***     11,836 ***     
Weak identification test2 11.15   11.15   11.15   
Root mean square error     5.145     5,457     2,028 
Source:  Authors’ estimation based on ACLED 2011, FSNAU 2011b, UCDP 2011, and UEA-CRU 2011. 
Note:  *** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficient estimates for region-fixed and time-fixed 
are not reported. TDI = Temperature Drought Index, ACLED = Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset, UCDP = Uppsala Conflict Data Program. 
1 Kleibergen-Paap rank LM statistic (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2007; Kleibergen and Paap 2006). The test statistic strongly rejects the null hypothesis of 
underidenfication. 
2 Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2007; Kleibergen and Paap 2006). 
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Table A.6—Reduced-form regression results of alternative model specifications, modifications of 
the temperature-based drought variable 
Drought variable TDI3 TDI1 TDI2 TDI4 TDI5 TDI6 
Dependent variable Number of conflicts 
TDI3, UEA-CRU, daily 
maximum, 1950–2009  
1.413 ***           
(0.372)           
TDI1, UEA-CRU, daily 
maximum, 1950–2009  
  0.426 **         
  (0.199)         
TDI2, UEA-CRU, daily 
maximum, 1950–2009  
    0.978 ***       
    (0.304)       
TDI4, UEA-CRU, daily 
maximum, 1950–2009  
      1.923 ***     
      (0.444)     
TDI5, UEA-CRU, daily 
maximum, 1950–2009  
        1.995 ***   
        (0.463)   
TDI6, UEA-CRU, daily 
maximum, 1950–2009  
          2.117 *** 
          (0.476) 
F-value 2.47 *** 2.40 *** 2.44 *** 2.50 *** 2.50 *** 2.51 *** 
R-squared 0.128 0.125 0.126 0.129 0.129 0.130 
      
Drought variable TDI3 TDI3 TDI3 TDI3 TA 
Dependent variable Number of conflicts 
TDI3, UEA-CRU, daily 
maximum, 1901–2009  
1.090 ***         
(0.337)         
TDI3, UEA-CRU, daily 
maximum, 1983–2009  
  0.923 ***       
  (0.318)       
TDI3, UEA-CRU, daily 
mean, 1950–2009  
    1.170 ***     
    (0.360)     
TDI3, NASA, daily mean, 
1997–2007) 
      0.617 ***   
      (0.238)   
TA, UEA-CRU, daily 
maximum, 1950–2009  
        0.230  
        (0.181) 
F-value 2.44 *** 2.43 *** 2.45 *** 2.05 *** 2.38 *** 
R-squared 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.108 0.124 
Source:  Authors’ estimation based on ACLED 2011, NASA 2011, and UEA-CRU 2011. 
Note:  ***,** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Coefficient estimates for region-fixed and time-fixed effects are not reported. The terminology 
of the drought variables is as follows: [drought index][reference period], [data source], [temperature measurement], 
[period for calculating long-term average]; TDI = Temperature Drought Index, TA = temperature anomaly, UEA-CRU = 
University of East Anglia Climate Research Unit. 
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Table A.7—Two-stage regression results of alternative model specifications, modifications of the 
temperature-based drought variable 
Drought variable TDI3 TDI1 TDI2 TDI4 TDI5 TDI6 
Stage 1 
Dependent variable Cattle price (log) 
TDI3, UEA-CRU, daily 
maximum, 1950–2009  
–0.123 ***           
(0.037)           
TDI1, UEA-CRU, daily 
maximum, 1950–2009  
  –0.065 ***         
  (0.019)         
TDI2, UEA-CRU, daily 
maximum, 1950–2009  
    –0.147 ***       
    (0.032)       
TDI4, UEA-CRU, daily 
maximum, 1950–2009  
      –0.140 ***     
      (0.042)     
TDI5, UEA-CRU, daily 
maximum, 1950–2009  
        –0.119 ***   
        (0.043)   
TDI6, UEA-CRU, daily 
maximum, 1950–2009  
          –0.138 *** 
          (0.044) 
F-value 8.47 *** 8.38 *** 8.64 *** 8.34 *** 8.34 *** 8.42 *** 
R-squared 0.302 0.302 0.308 0.302 0.302 0.300 
Underidentification test1 11.84 *** 12.62 *** 22.08 *** 11.48 *** 8.24 *** 10.32 *** 
Weak identification test2 11.15 12.14 21.47 11.06 7.79 9.73 
Stage 2                         
Dependent variable Number of conflicts 
Cattle price (log) –11.85 *** –7.12 ** –7.05 *** –14.09 *** –16.94 ** –15.42 *** 
  (4.187) (3.226) (2.206) (4.662) (6.696) (5.626) 
Root mean square error 5.15   4.46   4.45   5.57   6.17   5.84   
Drought variable TDI3 TDI3 TDI3 TDI3 TA 
Stage 1 
Dependent variable Cattle price (log) 
TDI3, UEA-CRU, daily 
mean, 1950–2009  
–0.139 ***         
(0.034)         
TDI3, UEA-CRU, daily 
maximum, 1901–2009  
  –0.112 ***       
  (0.032)       
TDI3, UEA-CRU, daily 
maximum, 1983–2009  
    –0.082 **     
    (0.035)     
TDI3, NASA, daily mean, 
1997–2007  
      –0.132 ***   
      (0.025)   
TA, UEA-CRU, daily 
maximum, 1950–2009  
        –0.029 * 
        (0.017) 
F-value 8.48 *** 8.45 *** 8.32 *** 9.10 *** 8.25 *** 
R-squared 0.304 0.301 0.302 0.300 0.324 
Underidentification test1 17.25 *** 12.64 *** 5.71 ** 28.10 *** 3.24 * 
Weak identification test2 16.99 12.01 5.39 27.25 3.04 
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Table A.7—Continued 
Drought variable TDI3 TDI3 TDI3 TDI3 TA 
Stage 2 
Dependent variable Number of conflicts 
Cattle price (log) –8.44 *** –10.82 ** –10.12 * –5.88 *** –7.58   
  (4.643) (4.579) (5.405) (2.237) (6.676) 
Root mean square error 4.62 4.97 4.86 4.29 4.51 
Source:  Authors’ estimation based on ACLED 2011, FSNAU 2011b, NASA 2011, and UEA-CRU 2011. 
Note:  ***,**,* Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficient estimates for region-fixed and time-fixed effects are not reported. The terminology 
of the drought variables is: [drought index][reference period], [data source], [temperature measurement], [period for calculating 
long-term average]; NASA = National Aeronautics and Space Administration, TDI = Temperature Drought Index, TA = 
temperature anomaly, UEA-CRU = University of East Anglia Climate Research Unit. 
1 Kleibergen-Paap rank LM statistic (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2007; Kleibergen and Paap 2006). The test statistic strongly 
rejects the null hypothesis of underidenfication. 
2 Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2007; Kleibergen and Paap 2006). 
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Table A.8—Reduced-form regression results of alternative model specifications, temperature versus precipitation 
Added precipitation variable PDI3 PDI1 PDI2 PDI4 PDI5 PDI6 PDI3 PA 
Dependent 
variable Number of conflicts 
TDI3 1.413 *** 1.394 *** 1.423 *** 1.411 *** 1.378 *** 1.375 *** 1.363 *** 1.225 *** 1.404 *** 
 (0.372) (0.372) (0.372) (0.372) (0.372) (0.372) (0.372) (0.398) (0.372) 
PDI3, UEA-CRU, 
1983–2009 
  –0.398 **               
 (0.178)        
PDI1, UEA-CRU, 
1983–2009 
    –0.254              
  (0.171)       
PDI2, UEA-CRU, 
1983–2009 
      –0.419 **           
   (0.170)      
PDI4, UEA-CRU, 
1983–2009 
        –0.421 **         
    (0.190)     
PDI5, UEA-CRU, 
1983–2009 
          –0.510 **       
     (0.200)    
PDI6, UEA-CRU, 
1983–2009 
            –0.623 ***     
      (0.212)   
PDI3, NASA, 
1997–2007 
              0.437 *   
       (0.240)  
PA, UEA–CRU, 
1950–2009 
                0.183  
        (0.179) 
F-value 2.47 *** 2.47 *** 2.50 *** 2.50 *** 2.49 *** 2.50 *** 2.52 *** 2.08 *** 2.46 *** 
R-squared 0.128 0.129 0.129 0.130 0.129 0.130 0.131 0.111 0.128 
Source:  Authors’ estimation based on ACLED 2011, NASA 2011, and UEA-CRU 2011. 
Note:  ***,**,* Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficient 
estimates for region-fixed and time-fixed effects are not reported. The terminology of the added precipitation variables is as follows: [drought index][reference period], 
[data source], [period for calculating long-term average]; PDI = Precipitation Drought Index, PA = precipitation anomaly. 
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Table A.9—Two-stage regression results of alternative model specifications, temperature versus precipitation 
Added precipitation variable PDI3 PDI1 PDI2 PDI4 PDI5 PDI6 PDI3 PA 
Stage 1 
Dependent variable Cattle price (log) 
TDI3 –0.123 *** –0.123 *** –0.125 *** –0.124 *** –0.124 *** –0.124 *** –0.124 *** –0.124 *** –0.136 *** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.044) 
PDI3, UEA-CRU, 1983–2009   0.002                
  (0.017)        
PDI1, UEA-CRU, 1983–2009     0.033 **             
   (0.017)       
PDI2, UEA-CRU, 1983–2009       0.007            
    (0.016)      
PDI4, UEA-CRU, 1983–2009         0.007          
     (0.018)     
PDI5, UEA-CRU, 1983–2009           0.019        
      (0.018)    
PDI6, UEA-CRU, 1983–2009             0.015      
       (0.019)   
PDI3, NASA, 1997–2007               –0.065 ***   
        (0.021)  
PA, UEA-CRU, 1950–2009                 0.007  
         (0.018) 
F-value 8.47 *** 8.41 *** 8.45 *** 8.41 *** 8.40 *** 8.40 *** 8.43 *** 9.02 *** 8.42 *** 
R-squared 0.302 0.302 0.304 0.302 0.303 0.302 0.302 0.320 0.302 
Underidentification test1 11.836 *** 12.013 *** 14.345 *** 11.862 *** 11.843 *** 12.184 *** 11.96 *** 20.698 *** 12.555 *** 
Weak identification test2 11.15 5.673 6.761 5.585 5.574 5.748 5.638 9921.00 6.014 
Stage 2 
Dependent variable Number of conflicts 
Cattle price (log) –11.85 *** –12.04 *** –10.52 *** –12.62 *** –12.43 *** –13.07 ** –13.23 *** –8.47 *** –11.58 *** 
  (4.187) (4.235) (3.692) (4.388) (4.324) (4.418) (4.469) (2.922) (4.025) 
Root mean square error 5.15 5.18 4.92 5.28 5.25 5.37 5.40 4.60 5.10 
Source:  Authors’ estimation based on ACLED 2011, FSNAU 2011b, NASA 2011, and UEA-CRU 2011. 
Note:  ***,**,* Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficient estimates for 
region-fixed and time-fixed effects are not reported. The terminology of the added precipitation variables is as follows: [drought index][reference period], [data source], [period for calculating 
long-term average]; PDI = Precipitation Drought Index, PA = precipitation anomaly, UEA-CRU = University of East Anglia Climate Research Unit.1 Kleibergen-Paap rank LM statistic 
(Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2007; Kleibergen and Paap 2006). The test statistic strongly rejects the null hypothesis of underidenfication.2 Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic (Baum, 
Schaffer, and Stillman 2007; Kleibergen and Paap 2006). 
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Table A.10—Two-stage regression results of alternative model specifications, modifications of 
livestock price index 
Stage 1 
Dependent variable Cattle, EQ Cattle, LQ Goat, EQ Sheep, EQ Camel, LQ 
Drought (TDI3) –0.123 *** –0.128 *** –0.008  0.039  –0.031  
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.028) (0.038) (0.041) 
Stage 2 
Dependent variable Number of conflicts 
Cattle, EQ –11.85 ***         
 (4.187)     
Cattle, LQ   –11.59 ***       
  (4.245)    
Goat, EQ     –177.6      
   (588.1)   
Sheep, EQ       25.24    
    (28.39)  
Camel, LQ         –46.22  
     (59.69) 
Observations 2,335 2,417 2,464 1,787 2,517 
Source:  Authors’ estimation based on ACLED 2011, FSNAU 2011b, and UEA-CRU 2011. 
Note:  *** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Coefficient estimates for region-fixed and time-fixed effects are not reported. The terminology of the livestock price 
index is as follows: [livestock], [quality]; EQ = export quality, LQ = local quality. All livestock prices are in logarithms 
and normalized by gasoline prices. Camel prices are available for local quality only. 
Table A.11—Two-stage regression results of alternative model specifications, modifications of cattle 
price normalization 
Normalizing price Gasoline Sugar Rice None 
Stage 1 
Dependent variable Cattle price (log) 
Drought (TDI3) –0.123 *** –0.053 * –0.053 * –0.038 * 
 (0.037) (0.032) (0.031) (0.028) 
Stage 2 
Dependent variable Number of conflicts 
Cattle price (log) –11.85 *** –27.55 *** –27.66 *** –38.44  
 (4.187) (16.67) (16.10) (28.07) 
Observations 2,335 2,510 2,524 2,531 
Source:  Authors’ estimation based on ACLED 2011, FSNAU 2011b, and UEA-CRU 2011. 
Note:  ***,* Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Coefficient estimates for region-fixed and time-fixed effects are not reported. TDI = 
Temperature Drought Index. 
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Table A.12—Two-stage regression results of alternative model specifications, time lags 
  No lags 1-month lag 2-month lag 3-month lag 4-month lag 5-month lag 
Stage 1 
Dependent variable Cattle price (log) 
TDI3             
t –0.123 *** –0.092 ** –0.106 ** –0.104 ** –0.100 ** –0.101 ** 
 (0.037) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
t-1   –0.059  –0.014  –0.039  –0.041  –0.039  
  (0.039) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
t-2     –0.071 * 0.013  0.003  0.001  
   (0.041) (0.049) (0.049) (0.05) 
t-3       –0.134 *** –0.096 ** –0.104 ** 
    ('0.041) (0.048) (0.048) 
t-4         –0.059  –0.029  
      (0.039) (0.048) 
t-5           –0.049  
        (0.042) 
Stage 2 
Dependent variable Number of conflicts 
Cattle price (log) –11.85 *** –12.54 *** –12.7 *** –11.5 *** –11.87 *** –12.54 *** 
  (4.187) (3.796) (3.612) (2.709) (2.665) (2.718) 
Source:  Authors’ estimation based on ACLED 2011, FSNAU 2011b, and UEA-CRU 2011. 
Note:  ***,**,* Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficient 
estimates for region-fixed and time-fixed effects are not reported. TDI = Temperature Drought Index. 
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Table A.13—Two-stage regression results of alternative model specifications; spatial dependency, seasonality, and nonlinearity 
Modification None Spatial dependency of order 1 
Spatial dependency 
of order 2 Seasonality Nonlinearity 
Stage 1 
Dependent variable Cattle price (log) 
TDI3 –0.123 *** –0.124 *** –0.127 *** –0.149 *** –0.229 *** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.049) (0.094) 
TDI3, spatially 
lagged in order 1 
  0.054        
 (0.121)      
TDI3, spatially 
lagged in order 2 
    0.645      
  (0.599)   
Rainy season (1 = 
yes, 0 = no) 
      –0.106    
   (0.076)  
TDI3 * rainy 
season 
      0.034    
   (0.06)  
TDI3 squared          0.063  
      (0.049) 
Stage 2 
Dependent variable Number of conflicts 
Cattle price (log) –11.85 *** –11.38 *** –10.23 *** –11.99 *** –9.97 *** 
  (4.187) (4.112) (3.805) (3.946) (3.739) 
Source:  Authors’ estimation based on ACLED 2011, FSNAU 2011b, and UEA-CRU 2011. 
Note:  *** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficient estimates for region-fixed and time-fixed effects 
are not reported. The dichotomous variable for the season considers that the timing and length of the seasons are slightly different in Northern and Southern Somalia 
compared to Central Somalia. TDI = Temperature Drought Index. 
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Table A.14—Two-stage regression results, validity of the instrumental variable 
IV estimation Just identified Overidentified LIML estimator 
Stage 1 
Dependent variable Cattle price (log) 
Drought (TDI3) –0.123 *** –0.108 *** –0.108 *** 
 (0.037) (0.045) (0.045) 
Exposure to international cattle prices   16,697 *** 16,697 *** 
  (2,644) (2,644) 
Stage 2 
Dependent variable Number of conflicts 
Cattle price (log) –11.85 *** –6.71 ** –6.81 ** 
 (4.187) (1.42) (1.455) 
F-value 8.47 *** 9.45 *** 9.45 *** 
R-squared 0.302 0.320 0.320 
Observations 2,335 1,905 1,905 
Underidentification test1 11.84 *** 48.23 *** 48.23 *** 
Weak identification test2 11.15 24.21 24.21 
Overidentification test (p-value)3   0.225 0.227 
Root mean square error 5.145 4.375 4.375 
Source:  Authors’ estimation based on ACLED 2011, UEA-CRU 2011, IMF 2011, and FSNAU 2011b. 
Note:  ***,** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Coefficient estimates for region-fixed and time-fixed effects are not reported. TDI = 
Temperature Drought Index, LIML = Limited Information Maximum Likelihood. 
1 Kleibergen-Paap rank LM statistic (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2007; Kleibergen and Paap 2006). The test statistic 
of the augmented regression strongly rejects the null hypothesis of underidenfication. 
2 Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2007; Kleibergen and Paap 2006). 
3 Hansen J statistic (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2007). The test statistic of the augmented regression does not reject 
the null hypothesis of zero correlation between the instrumental variables and the error term.
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Table A.15—Two-stage regression results, additional channels of transmission 
Additional channels None Precipitation Agricultural wage 
Wheat flour 
price Maize price 
Red sorghum 
price Rice price 
Stage 1               
Dependent variable Cattle price (log) 
TDI3 –0.123 *** –0.123 *** –0.127 *** –0.141 *** –0.143 *** –0.144 *** –0.129 *** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) 
PDI3   0.002  0.012  0.015  0.006  0.004  0.009  
   (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
Agricultural wage,     –0.034 *         
(t-1)    (0.020)         
Wheat flour price,       –0.029        
(t-1)      (0.023)       
Maize price,         –0.081 *     
(t-1)        (0.042)     
Red sorghum price,           –0.015    
(t-1)          (0.024)   
Rice price,             –0.145 *** 
(t-1)                       (0.046) 
Stage 2 
Dependent variable Number of conflicts 
Cattle price (log) –11.85 *** –11.97 *** –11.72 *** –12.07 *** –10.05 *** –10.50 *** –10.89 *** 
 (4.187) (4.203) (4.152) (4.056) (3.534) (3.501) (3.952) 
PDI3   –0.399  –0.359  –0.428  –0.581 ** –0.434  –0.370  
   (0.271) (0.287) (0.306) (0.281) (0.276) (0.276) 
Agricultural wage,     –0.286          
(t-1)    (0.394)         
Wheat flour price,       –0.530        
(t-1)      (0.359)       
Maize price,         2.394 ***     
(t-1)        (0.659)     
Red sorghum price,           –0.127    
(t-1)          (0.358)   
Rice price,             1.889 ** 
(t-1)            (0.924) 
Observations 2,335 2,335 2,066 1,888 1,958 1,980 2,081 
Source:  Authors’ estimation based on ACLED 2011, UEA-CRU 2011, and FSNAU 2011b. 
Note:  ***,**,* Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficient 
estimates for region-fixed and time-fixed effects are not reported. Wage rates and all food prices are normalized by gasoline prices. They enter the regressions in 
logarithmic terms and lagged by one month. TDI = Temperature Drought Index, PDI = Precipitation Drought Index.
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